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STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction of theft in the Third 
Judicial District Court. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
In a jury trial before the Honorable Peter F. Leary, 
Third District Court, Appellant was convicted of the charge 
of theft. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant prays that the conviction entered in the 
Third District Court be reversed, that this matter be re-
manded to the Third District Court for new trial. 
FACTS 
Appellant entered into a business arrangement with 
Complaintant, David Felger, and several other individuals 
where real property was to be bought and sold by a business 
entity they created. In order to facilitate the plans of 
the company, financing needed to be acquired. At the point 
in time that these transactions were taking place, money was 
not generally available within local lending facilities. 
Appellant made arrangements with a local lending institution 
to make loans on a project the parties were involved in. 
Complaintant David Felger testified that he provided the sum 
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of $11, 700.00 to Appellant for the purpose of paying spread 
money to attract monies from New York to the local banking 
institution in order to allow the loan, being negotiated by 
the parties, to be made. Complaintant charges that Defendant, 
instead of using the money for the intended purpose, converted 
it for his own use. 
Defendant testified that he, in fact, received the 
money from Complaintant but that prior to receiving the money 
he had advised Complaintant that the money would not be 
necessary for spread money and testified that Complaintant 
agreed that the money could be used to offset personal ex-
penses of the Appellant in continuing to work for the parties. 
Defendant testified that it was intended, at all times, that 
David Felger would get his money back when the company re-
ceived it's loans. 
For reasons not related to the conduct of either Com-
plaintant or Appellant, the loan for the project was never 
approved and the outside financing was never acquired. A 
portion of the monies received by the Appellant were returned 
to the Complaintant. 
I. 
THE COURT INSTRUCTION THAT "THE LAW PRESUMES THAT A 
PERSON INTENDS THE REASONABLE AND ORDINARY CONSEQUENCES OF 
HIS OWN ACTS" REVERSED THE BURDEN OF PROOF FROM THE PLAINTIFF 
TO THE DEFENDANT AND, ACCORDINGLY, WAS A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS 
TO THE DEFENDANT. 
In the trial of the above matter, Defendant's receipt 
d h t . n The issue is an use of t e money was never a ques io . 
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whether the receipt was with felonious intent. On the issue 
of intent, the Court instructed the jury over the objection 
of Defendant as follows: 
Intent or purpose, being a state of mind, 
is not always susceptible of proof by direct and 
positive evidence and must ordinarily be inferred 
from acts, conduct, statements, and circumstances. 
The law presumes that a person intends the reason-
able and ordinary consequences of his acts. How-
ever, this presumption is a rebuttable presumption 
and may be overcome by evidence to the contrary. 
Utah law, consistent with Federal due process require-
ments creates a presumption of innocence and requires that 
each dnd every element of any offense be proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Within the elements of the crime necessary 
for proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the culpable mental state 
is specifically included. UCA 76-l-501(2)(b), In re Winship 
397 US 358, 25 L Ed 2d 368, 90 S Ct. 1068, (1970) -
It was then clearly the burden of the State to prove 
the culpable mental state of Appellant. An important part of 
this proof was drawn from the Court's presumption, built on 
Appellant's receipt and use of the money.l 
But this is not to say all inferences are infirm. The 
legislature has provided an inference of knowledge of stolen 
property in the face of recent possession and no good explan-
ation, UCA 76-6-402, but in this instance, no reversal of 
1. The presumption used by the Court in the instant case is 
not one codified by the legislature and, accordingly. re-
presents no burden the legislature has seen fit to place 
upon Defendants. The legislature, rather, under UCA ?6-
1-501, seems comfortable to leave the burden for proving 
culpable mental state on the shoulders of the State. 
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burden is provided as the State must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the Defendant's explanation is not reasonable. 
State v. Wood, 268 P.2d 998. 
If the presumption is merely a permissive inference which 
does not require a finding of the elemental fact upon proof 
of the fact, but rather serves as evidence of its existence 
and proof, no added burden has been placed upon the Defendant. 
Ulster Countv Court v. Allen, ~US~-' 60 L Ed 2d 777, 99 
S Ct. (1979). In ULSTER, Defendants were convicted of pos-
session of a firearm when they were fotmd riding in the same 
automobile with a young lady whose open purse contained two 
firearms in plain view. The Court, in that case, instructed 
the jury that is was entitled to infer possession from the 
Defendant's presence in the car where the guns were found. In 
upholding the conviction, the Court stated: 
The trial court instructions make it clear 
that the presumption was merely a part of the 
prosecution's case; that it gave rise to a per-
missive inference available only in certain 
circumstances rather than a mandatory conclusion 
of possession and that it could be ignored by 
the jury even if there was no affirmative proof 
offered by Defendants in rebuttal. Id. US~-
60 L Ed 2d 777, 794. 
Accordingly, in determining whether the instruction given in 
the instant case meets constitutional muster, the nature of 
the presumption must be determined. In making this deter-
mination, it is necessary to look at the actual words spoken 
and how a reasonable juror could have interpreted the in-
structions. Sandstrom v. Montana, us , 61 L Ed 2d 
-4-
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39, 99 S Ct. , (1979). In SANDSTROM, the Court dealt with 
an instruction similar to that given in the instant case but 
ending short with: "The law presumes that a person intends 
the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts." Id., 
US 61 L Ed 2d 39, 43. In concluding that that instructior. 
failed to meet constitutional requirements of due process, the 
Court determined that: 
"The challenged jury instruction had the 
effect of releasing the State of the burden of 
proof enunciated in WINSHIP on the critical 
question of petitioners state of mind." Id. 
US , 61 L Ed 2d, 39, 49. 
T'.:e instant presumption, however, does not go so far, 
to be conclusive, but allows the Defendant to overcome and r~ 
but the presumption by offering affirmative evidence. If the 
presumption was clearly mandatory, there would be no question 
of it's unconstitutionality. However, where some latitutde 
is granted to the jury, the decision of constitutuionality 
must rest upon whether the presumption creates merely an infer· 
ence, which may be overcome by any amount of evidence pre-
sented by the Defendant, or one that shifts the burden to 
the Defendant to prove his lack of guilty state of mind. Id. 
And, as established in SANDSTROM, the test is neither the stac 
utory intent, with respect to such presumptions, nor the in-
tent of the judge but whether a reasonable juror could have 
interpreted this instruction to place a burden upon the 
Defendant. 
In the instant case, the acts of the Defendant re-
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sulted in the Complaintant losing possession of at least a 
portion of money. The only real issue litigated in the case 
was whether the Complaintant's loss was as a result of Appel-
lant's intent to deprive him of the money. The consequence 
of the acts of the Appellant stands for a presumption of 
intent to deprive under the instruction given by the Court. 
Following the instruction, the jury would then look to Appel-
lant to rebut and overcome this evidence in order to prove his 
innocence. The ordinary and probability reading of these 
words by any juror is not the inference of ULSTER; one that 
could be ignored by the jury even if there was no affirmative 
proof offered by the Defendant in rebuttal. The Court's in-
struction does not even tell the jury that the production of any 
evidence by the Defendant would overcome the presumption. This 
interpretation was argued by the State of Montana in SANDSTROM 
and found by the Court to be not the logical, let alone the 
possible interpretation in this case. In fact, one would wonder 
if such an instruction could have any meaning under such an 
interpretation when some evidence had, in fact, been advanced, 
as in the instant case. 
It is far more logical and certainly possible that the 
reasonable juror, faced with this instruction, would attempt to 
weigh the evidence presented by the defendant to determine if 
that evidence is sufficient to overcome the presumption of 
guilt established by the ordinary consequences of his act. 
-6-
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Once the jury, or even one juror looks to the Defendant to 
prove his state of mind, based only on his performance of 
the acts alleged, the State has been relieved of it's burden 
to prove culpable mental state beyond a reasonable doubt. 
SANDSTROM does not require a showing that the jury 
or a juror actually made this interpretation, only that one 
or more reasonably could have made such an interpretation. 
There is more than a possibility that one or more jurors 
shifted the burden of proof to Appellant, relying on this 
instruction. Accordingly, the instruction was improper and 
the matter should be remanded for new trial. 
II. 
THE COURT ERRORED IN PROVIDING AN INSTRUCTION ON 
DEFINITION OF THE TERM "KNOWINGLY" IN CONJUNCTION WITH 
INTENT AND PURPOSE. 
In the instant case, a part of it's Instruction No. 6 
over objection of the Defendant, the Court included the 
following: 
In a case such as this, under the law, 
no person is guilty of an offense unless his 
conduct is prohibited by law and he acts in-
tentially or knowingly. A person acts inten-
tionally under the law, either with respect 
to the nature of his conduct or to the results 
of his conduct, when it is that persons con-
scious objective or desire to engage in the 
conduct or cause the result. A person acts 
knowingly when he is aware of the nature of 
his conduct or the existing circumstances or 
that his conduct is reasonably certain to 
cause the result. 
Appellant was charged under Utah Code Annotated, 76-6-404 
with the crime of theft. The language of that section re-
-7-
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quires "a purpose to deprive", calling for a specific culpable 
mental state known as specific intent. This standard requires 
a conscious purpose, not constructive intent, resulting from 
any degree of recklessness or knowledge of possible danger to 
the Cornplaintant. 
But in it's instruction, the Court required, not a 
finding that the Appellant engaged in conduct which deprived 
the Complaintant of his property intentionally, but alternate-
ly, knowingly. This, of itself, might not have been so bad 
except the instruction of knowingly further establishes culp-
ability if the Appellant's conduct is reasonably certain to 
cause the result. The result, in this case, being the loss 
of property to the Complaintant. In many cases and situations, 
this may present no problem, but in the instant case where 
the conduct of the Appellant may well be determined by a jury 
to have been reckless and in opposition to the best interests 
of the Complaintant, logically leading to the deprivation of 
his property. There is a great risk that the requirement for 
proof of intent may have been watered down. Appellant was not 
charged with the crime of reckless loss of Complaintant's 
money, but may well have been convicted of such a non-crime 
based on the instruction complained of herein. 
Appellant's conviction should be reversed and the 
case remanded for new trial. 
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CONCLUSION 
This case having turned on the issue of intent. 
and the constitutional standard for proof of that important 
element having been placed in grave doubt through the 
erroneous allowance of Court Instruction Number 6, the 
Appellant's conviction should be reversed and the matter 
remanded for new trial. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do certify that a copy of the foregoing Brief was 
mailed, postage fully pre-paid, to: Robert B. Hansen, Utah 
Attorney General, State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84114, and Craig Barlow, Deputy Utah Attorney General, 
State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 
day of March, 1980. 
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